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List of All Parties 
 
This case originated as a case filed by Dawn Boyd Woodson against parties she 
thought responsible for the death of her son.  Those claims were resolved by settlement.  
The appellate proceedings, including the Writ of Certiorari proceedings concern the 
resolution of competing claims between Appellant/Petitioner Clyde Snow & Sessions, 
P.C. (“Clyde Snow”) and Appellee/Respondent Thomas D. Boyle (“Boyle”) to attorney’s 
fees owed by Ms. Woodson and initially paid to her then attorneys, Prince Yeates and 
Geldzahler, P.C. (“PYG”) from settlement proceeds. The district court established an 
interpleader proceeding after PYG deposited the fees at issue into court, designating 
Clyde Snow, Boyle and Matthew Wiese (another attorney) as parties.   
Only Boyle and Clyde Snow participated in the interpleader proceedings before 
the district court and the appeal of the district court’s judgment thereon to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Only Boyle and Clyde Snow are parties to the instant proceeding.  
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(2), 
(3) and (5) (2016), Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah State Constitution, and Rule 45 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Issue:  Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that 
Petitioner/Appellant Clyde Snow & Sessions, P.C. (“Clyde Snow”) did not timely 
intervene in the underlying wrongful death action (the “Action”) and that no party to the 
action waived the requirements for formal intervention. 
  Standard of Review:  On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than of the trial court, giving it no deference and 
applying a correctness of error standard.  Nichols v. Jacobsen Const. Co., 2016 UT 19, 
¶ 13, 374 P.3d 3.  The Supreme Court also applies the same standard of review used by 
the Court of Appeals.  Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998).  
The Court of Appeals’ decision, Boyle v. Clyde Snow & Sessions PC, 2016 UT App 114, 
378 P.3d 98 (the “Opinion”) is attached as Add. A. 
 “[A] ruling on a motion to intervene encompasses several types of analysis, each 
subject to a different standard of review.”  Supernova Media, Inc. v. Pia Anderson Dorius 
Reynard & Moss, LLC, 2013 UT 7, ¶ 14, 297 P.3d 599.  Appellate courts “review the 
district court's legal determinations for correctness,” but will “not disturb the district 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Taylor-W. Weber Water 
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Improvement Dist. v. Olds, 2009 UT 86, ¶ 3, 224 P.3d 709.  In addition, a district court 
has discretion to determine whether to grant permissive intervention, and its decisions in 
this regard are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Id.  The district court’s determination of 
whether a request to intervene was timely is also reviewed for “abuse of discretion” 
because “timeliness depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”  
Supernova, 2013 UT 7 at ¶ 15 (quotations and citation omitted).  
“Waiver presents a mixed question of law and fact.”  Mower v. Nibley, 2016 UT 
App 174, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 614.  “[W]hether the trial court employed the proper standard of 
waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or 
events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual 
determinations, to which we give a district court deference.”  Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 2. Issue:  Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding Clyde Snow’s 
arguments regarding its status as an interpleader party were inadequately briefed and did 
not demonstrate such a status.   
  Standard of Review:  On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the Court of 
Appeals’ decision for correctness, applying the same standard of review applicable to the 
Court of Appeals.  Nichols, 2016 UT 19 at ¶ 13; Coulter, 966 P.2d at 855.  The question 
of adequate briefing turns on the interpretation of both the Court of Appeals’ decision 
below and Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which present questions of 
law.  See Nichols, 2016 UT 19 at ¶ 13 (reviewing Court of Appeals’ decision for 
correctness); Simler v. Chilel, 2016 UT 23, ¶ 9, 379 P.3d 1195 (reviewing interpretations 
3 
 
of procedural rules for correctness).  
With respect to the district court’s authority to order the deposit of funds into court 
and to decide how to distribute those funds among contesting claimants through equitable 
interpleader, the standard of review is abuse of discretion.  “An action in interpleader is a 
proceeding in equity . . . .”  Terry Sales, Inc. v. Vender Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 
1980).  “[A] trial court is accorded considerable latitude and discretion in applying and 
formulating an equitable remedy, and [it] will not be overturned unless it [has] abused its 
discretion.”  Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 42, 189 P.3d 51.  
 3. Issue:  If Clyde Snow did not acquire party status, whether this Court can 
acquire jurisdiction via a petition for writ of certiorari to reverse or vacate a Court of 
Appeals’ decision that purported to declare a district court’s judgment void 
notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ concession of a lack of appellate jurisdiction.  
  Standard of Review:  The “propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination” is 
a “question of law,” reviewed for correctness.  Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28, ¶ 6, 234 
P.3d 1100 (quotations and citation omitted).  
 Preservation of Issues:  Each of these issues was presented or fairly included 
within Clyde Snow’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the “Petition”).  (Petition, at 1, 8-20.) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
 Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah State Constitution is determinative of the 
jurisdictional issue (Issue #3), which provides, in pertinent part: 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs . . . and power to issue all writs and orders 
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necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the 
complete determination of any cause. 
 
Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3. 
 There are no statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions determinative of the other 
issues.  However, Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 and Utah R. Civ. P. 22, 24 and 67 have some 
relation to the remaining issues and are included in Add. B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This case originated as a case filed by Dawn Boyd Woodson (“Ms. Woodson”) 
against parties she thought responsible for the death of her son (the “underlying action” 
or “Woodson case”).  The claims in the underlying action were resolved by settlement.  
The proceedings germane to this appeal, including the appellate proceedings before the 
Court of Appeals and before this Court on writ of certiorari, concern the district court’s 
resolution of competing claims between Clyde Snow and one of its former attorneys, 
Respondent/Appellee Thomas D. Boyle (“Boyle”), to recover attorney fees for work 
provided in the underlying action under a contingency-fee arrangement.   
The district court in the underlying action accepted the deposit of attorney fees by 
Prince Yeates and Geldzahler, P.C. (“PYG”), counsel for Ms. Woodson at the time of 
settlement, into court and thereafter conducted a trial between Clyde Snow and Boyle to 
resolve competing claims to those fees. The issues before this Court involve the district 
court’s authority to conduct proceedings and enter rulings to resolve competing claims 
between attorneys to recover attorney fees that had been deposited into the district court.   
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Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
Clyde Snow has combined the Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
because the material events involve the course of proceedings and disposition below.   
Background 
The underlying case was filed as a wrongful death matter involving the 
unfortunate death of Caleb Jensen, a minor, who died while attending a youth reform 
wilderness camp.  R. 4694, 4729-30.  Ms. Woodson retained Clyde Snow on a 
contingency-fee basis to represent her individually and as personal representative 
regarding claims associated with the death of her son.  R. 4694, 4866-70.       
Clyde Snow provided representation from May 2007 through the end of May 
2010.  R. 4741-4837.  Clyde Snow’s contingency-fee contract with Ms. Woodson states 
that Clyde Snow was entitled to receive “forty percent (40%) of any Recovery,” and that 
Clyde Snow “shall have a lien on any claim, suit or recovery for fees, costs and expenses 
arising out of or related to” its representation.  R. 4867-68.  This contract also provides 
that “[i]n the event of a Recovery after the Firm [Clyde Snow] has been discharged, the 
Firm shall be compensated for the reasonable value of the Firm’s services.”  R. at 4869-
70. 
Boyle was employed by Clyde Snow during Clyde Snow’s representation of 
Woodson.  Clyde Snow assigned Boyle to serve as lead counsel.  R. 4695-96, 4840.  In 
June 2010, Boyle left Clyde Snow to join PYG, and representation on the Woodson case 
transferred from Clyde Snow to PYG, where it remained until a settlement was reached 
in June 2013.  R. 4877-4921, 1028-30.    
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Prior to his departure from Clyde Snow to commence employment with PYG, 
Boyle co-authored a letter to Ms. Woodson informing her that Boyle was leaving Clyde 
Snow effective June 1, 2010, and that Ms. Woodson had “the prerogative of deciding 
whether your legal work follows [Boyle] to [PYG] or remains with Clyde Snow & 
Sessions.”   R. at 4877.  Ms. Woodson elected to stay with Boyle, but praised Clyde 
Snow for its “hard work.”  Id.     
Under Boyle’s direction, Clyde Snow invested 2,761.2 hours of professional time 
in the Woodson case.  R. 4819, 4829.  The Woodson case settled for $XXXX.00,1  and 
generated an overall attorney fee collected by PYG of $XXXX.00.  Id.   
Attorney’s Lien Proceedings 
 On July 7, 2010, Clyde Snow filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien in the Woodson 
case.  R. 1030-33, 6077, 6110-11.  On June 28, 2013, upon learning of the settlement of 
the Woodson case, Clyde Snow filed a Restated Notice of Attorney’s Lien and Objection 
to Dismissal of Action (the “Objection”).  R. 4669-4673.  At the time, Clyde Snow had 
not been informed of the amount of the confidential settlement, and thus could not state 
the full value of its lien.  See id.    
On July 15, 2013, the Court held a hearing on the request to dismiss the Woodson 
case in light of Clyde Snow’s Objection.  R. 4677-78.  During this hearing, Blake S. 
Atkin (“Mr. Atkin”), then counsel for Boyle and PYG, did not object to Clyde Snow’s 
participation in the hearing.  R. 6528 (generally).  Mr. Atkin instead asked the district 
                                                            
1  References to the amount of the settlement and the attorney’s fees from settlement 
in the Woodson case are redacted pursuant to a Court of Appeals’ order dated May 6, 
2015.   
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court to retain jurisdiction over Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien by indicating that he 
intended to file a petition to invalidate the attorney’s lien on the basis that Clyde Snow 
had “abandoned” the case, and that he may seek an evidentiary hearing.  R. 6528, pp. 5-6.  
No objection was raised on behalf of Ms. Woodson by any attorney representing her, or 
purporting to represent her, at the hearing, including PYG, Boyle or Mr. Atkin.  R. 6528. 
Counsel for the defendants to the underlying action also did not object to Clyde 
Snow’s participation in the July 2013 hearing or Clyde Snow’s request that the Court 
retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of resolving its attorney lien.  R. 6528, pp. 6-8.  
Instead, defendants’ counsel merely “voice[d] our concern,” and “wonder[ed]” whether 
“it would not be more expedient” for Clyde Snow to commence a separate action.  Id., 
pp. 7-8.  However, the Court then asked: 
THE COURT:  If I were to enter an order dismissing all claims 
against your client[s] with prejudice, however, and simply leaving 
open the issue of the attorney’s lien, wouldn’t that get you what you 
needed? 
 
Id., p. 8.  To this question, defendants’ counsel responded:  “I think so, Your Honor.  I 
just think it would be cleaner the other way.” Id.   
 Following discussions about procedures to maintain the confidentiality of the 
settlement, the district court elected to continue its jurisdiction over Clyde Snow’s 
attorney’s lien, but otherwise dismissed with prejudice the remaining portions of the 
Woodson case.  Id., pp. 16-17.  Prior to making this ruling, however, the district court 
stated:  
THE COURT:   All right.   Let me tell what you I’m inclined to do 
before I make it a formal ruling. And that is to issue an order that the 
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amounts of the settlement that is not earmarked for the plaintiff, 
either directly or pursuant to anything in the probate court that would 
require money paid there, so the amount that is earmarked for fees 
and costs be held by Prince Yeates in a trust account and not violated 
until this matter is resolved.     
 
I would ask the parties to resubmit an order of dismissal making 
clear that all of the claims against the defendants are hereby 
dismissed, but leaving the case open for the sole and limited purpose 
of determining Clyde Snow’s attorney’s fees lien.   
 
I would ask the parties to brief the matter with Mr. Atkin going first 
and then the - - and then the Clyde Snow folks next.   And before we 
have an evidentiary hearing on the case, I’m going to require the 
parties to mediate this. . . . 
 
So having said that, is there anybody, even though you might not 
like what I’m saying, have a strong objection and believe that I’m in 
error in any part of that?  
 
Id. (emphasis added).  In response, no party objected.  Id.  The parties approved orders 
reflecting the district court’s rulings that were thereafter entered. R. 4683-89, 6529-32.  
The parties attempted to mediate on November 22, 2013.  R. 4922-24.  Mediation 
failed and, on January 17, 2014, Clyde Snow filed a Second Restated Notice of 
Attorney’s Lien, asserting a right to recover $XXXX.00.  R. 4925-5049.  Prior to this 
time, Clyde Snow was unable to demand a sum certain for its lien because Clyde Snow 
had not previously been informed of the amount of the settlement or the time and costs 
invested by PYG.  On January 26, 2014, Boyle filed a request asking the district court to 
schedule an evidentiary hearing regarding Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien.  R. 5050-51.   
Interpleader Proceedings to Resolve All Claims Regarding Attorney’s Fees 
On January 30, 2014, PYG filed a motion to interplead funds, representing: 
Prince Yeates currently holds $XXXX.00 in its trust account relative 
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to the Lien.  However, Prince Yeates has no interest in the 
$XXXX.00, except that such funds must be used to satisfy the Lien 
once the dispute as to the amount of Clyde Snow’s claim is resolved 
by the Court.  The only parties with claims to the $XXXX.00 are 
Mr. Boyle and Mr. Wiese, and Clyde Snow.  Prince Yeates should 
be allowed to interplead the $XXXX.00 into Court, in order to avoid 
any risk of liability, including multiple liability, to Clyde Snow and 
Mr. Boyle and Mr. Wiese, and so that the Court can adjudicate the 
respective claims of Mr. Boyle and Mr. Wiese, and Clyde Snow, 
relative to this amount.    
 
R. 5075; see also R. 5073-86.  PYG had not withdrawn as counsel for Ms. Woodson at 
the time.  See Record Index. 
Clyde Snow consented to the interpleader. R. 5090-92.   Boyle did not oppose 
PYG’s motion to deposit fees and establish an interpleader.  R. 5104-83.  To the contrary, 
Boyle answered the interpleader and cross-claimed against Clyde Snow.  Id.  In his 
answer, Boyle admitted that “once Prince Yeates deposits the sum of $XXXX.00 . . ., 
Prince Yeates on information and belief will have no further liability, including multiple 
liability to the stakeholders, including Clyde Snow and Boyle, concerning their disputes 
to the Lien.”  R. 5106.  Boyle further stated:  “Should the Court rule that the correct sum 
to be interpleaded is in fact $XXXX.00, Boyle does not intend to contest the issue 
further[.]”  Id.   
By Orders dated March 25 and 27, 2014, R. 5275-76, the district court established 
the interpleader pursuant to PYG’s motion, and directed that $XXXX.00 of the fees held 
by PYG be deposited into court pursuant to “Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”  R. 5276, attached as Add. C  The district court also ordered that “once 
Prince Yeates deposit[s] these funds with the Court, Prince Yeates will have no further 
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liability to Clyde Snow, or to Mr. Boyle, or to Mr. Wiese . . . .” Id. 
 On April 3, 2014, PYG provided notice that it had deposited $XXXX.00 into 
court.  R. 5284-5288.  Clyde Snow then filed a complaint, and then an amended 
complaint, seeking to recover the interpleader res, stating causes of action for (i) lien 
foreclosure, (ii) declaratory relief/damages, and (iii) unjust enrichment.  R. 5289-5466.   
 On April 28, 2014, Boyle filed a “Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Clyde Snow’s 
Purported Attempt to Intervene.”  R. 5467-74.  Despite previously filing his own pleading 
seeking to recover the interpleaded fees, Boyle claimed Clyde Snow failed to intervene as 
required by Utah law to enforce its attorney’s lien.  Id.  On May 5, 2014, however, Boyle 
also filed an answer and counterclaim to Clyde Snow’s amended complaint.  R. 5509-85.   
 On June 10, 2014, the district court held a hearing, during which Boyle agreed that 
any obligation by Clyde Snow to intervene to enforce its attorney’s lien had been waived: 
THE COURT:  Okay.  But why did it take then nine months for you 
to make that motion?  I mean I’m sitting here thinking, frankly, this 
issue has been waived.  I mean you have orders from the Court that 
clearly reflect the Court’s understanding that Snow’s interest is 
going to be looked at.  They filed a restated notice of lien back last 
June.  There are lots of things that happened.  We go through this 
process, and then it’s not until within the last month or so that you 
object.  I mean haven’t by your - - by your silence haven’t you 
acquiesced to allowing this Court to determine Clyde Snow’s 
interest here? 
 
MR BOYLE:  Your Honor, if I were in your position I think I would 
probably agree with that. . . . 
 
R. 6524, pp. 9-10. 
On July 1, 2014, the district court entered a written order denying Boyle’s Motion 
to Dismiss on three grounds.  R. 6284-87, attached as Add. D.  First, the district court 
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ruled that “Clyde Snow is a proper interpleader party herein and that any issue or other 
procedural objection associated with the requirement to present a formal motion to 
intervene has been resolved by prior orders of the Court, and establishment of the 
interpleader.”  R. 6285.  Second, “as an additional basis,” the district court ruled that 
“Clyde Snow has substantially complied with such obligation by filing a pleading that 
sets forth the grounds and related claims through and by which Clyde Snow seeks to 
recover in relationship to the funds.”  Id.   Third, as a further “additional basis,” the 
district court ruled that “any objection based on the requirement to present a formal 
motion to intervene has been waived based on the substantial process and other events 
that have occurred since July of 2013.”  Id.  
 The district court held an evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2014.  R. 6525.  Clyde 
Snow called five witnesses, including an expert witness to render an opinion on the 
reasonableness of Clyde Snow’s fee demand, and offered eleven exhibits which were 
admitted by the Court.  R. 6525, pp. 9-127.  Boyle briefly testified and recalled one of 
Clyde Snow’s witnesses, but did not call Ms. Woodson even though she was present.  Id., 
pp. 12, 128-37, 148.  Boyle presented no expert testimony and offered no exhibits.  Id., 
pp. 128-37, 148. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court ruled that Clyde Snow was entitled 
to recover the entire interpleader res of $XXXX.00 in satisfaction of its attorney’s lien 
and, based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, entered detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to support its decision.  R. 6322-33, attached as Add. E; R. 6525, pp. 
168-177.  The district court ordered the release of the entire interpleader res to Clyde 
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Snow on July 17, 2014, R. 6343-45, and the funds were released by check on July 18, 
2014.  R. 6353-57.  
Proceedings before the Utah Court of Appeals 
Boyle appealed the district court’s judgment.  R. 6370-72.  The Utah Court of 
Appeals heard argument on November 19, 2015.  On February 16, 2016, the Court of 
Appeals issued an Order directing supplemental briefing on the following issue: “Where 
the Appellant [Boyle] was not a party to the underlying action, does the Utah Court of 
Appeals have jurisdiction over this appeal?”  (Order, attached as Add. F).  The Court of 
Appeals also directed the parties to address the effect of Utah Down Syndrome Found., 
Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass’n, 2012 UT 86, 293 P.3d 241.  Id.  
The Court of Appeals issued its Opinion on May 10, 2016, reversing on the basis 
that it thought the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute 
because Boyle and Clyde Snow were never made parties to the case.  See Boyle, 2016 UT 
App 114 at ¶¶1, 25.  The Court of Appeals thus determined it lacked appellate 
jurisdiction over Boyle’s appeal but, lacking jurisdiction, still purported to declare the 
district court’s orders void.  See id. at ¶¶ 23-25.   
In so ruling, the Court of Appeals first stated: 
Neither Boyle nor Clyde Snow formally intervened in the action 
below and, aside from their interest in being paid for representing 
Woodson, neither has a stake in the subject matter of the underlying 
action . . . Subject matter jurisdiction is not a matter of the court's 
discretion . . . Accordingly, as a threshold matter, we must determine 
whether Clyde Snow properly intervened in the underlying action to 
enforce its attorney lien. If it did not, the district court had no 
jurisdiction and any order based on motions made by and for the 
interests of the non-parties are void. 
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Id. at ¶ 12.  The Court of Appeals thus determined Clyde Snow failed to “timely” 
intervene in the action and that any effort to intervene by June of 2013 would have been 
untimely.  Id. at ¶ 16.  The Court of Appeals also determined the parties did not “waive” 
any objection to intervention.  Id. at ¶ 22.  The Court of Appeals concluded:   
Because Clyde Snow did not submit a timely application to 
intervene and the parties did not waive the intervention 
requirements, it was not a party to the underlying case. As a result, 
the district court erred by keeping the underlying case open to 
resolve Clyde Snow's lien. Furthermore, because Clyde Snow, 
Boyle, and Prince Yeates were not parties to the underlying action, 
the court lacked jurisdiction to make orders with regard to their post-
judgment motions.  
 
Id. at ¶ 25.   
By way of footnote, the Court of Appeals rejected Clyde Snow’s argument that 
any requirement to formally intervene had been waived or mooted by the establishment 
of an interpleader identifying Clyde Snow and Boyle as parties to the interpleader, which 
allowed them to advance their claims against the res of deposited fees.  See id., ¶ 23 n.4; 
see also Brief of Appellee to Court of Appeals, pp. 22-23.  The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that “what [PYG] filed was not in fact an interpleader action” because PYG’s 
filing was formally styled as a “motion” for leave to interplead funds, rather than as a 
complaint.  Id.   
 Clyde Snow filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (the “Petition”) on July 27, 
2016.  This Court “provisionally granted” the Petition on October 7, 2016, subject to the 
Court’s “determination of its jurisdiction” on the issues identified herein.  (Order 
Granting Petition, p. 1). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The Court of Appeals’ Opinion elevates form over substance and disregards the 
substantial record establishing the district court acted within its discretion to allow Clyde 
Snow to participate in the underlying action as a formal or de facto party for the limited 
purpose of resolving its claim to recover fees.  No person or entity submitted a timely 
objection to Clyde Snow’s participation or to the district court’s decision to allow the fees 
at issue to be deposited with the court while the competing claimants – Clyde Snow and 
Boyle – litigated their entitlement to these fees. The Court of Appeals’ decision should be 
reversed.    
A. Intervention 
 The Court of Appeals first held the district court erred by continuing its 
jurisdiction to resolve Clyde Snow’s fee claim because Clyde Snow’s efforts to intervene 
were untimely.  This ruling is erroneous in several respects.   
First, it disregards the unique nature of the contingency-fee arrangement giving 
rise to Clyde Snow’s fee claim and the district court’s substantial discretion to determine 
the timeliness of a request to intervene, as well as its discretion to permit intervention. 
Although Clyde Snow did not file a document entitled “Motion to Intervene,” Clyde 
Snow’s June 28, 2013 Objection to dismissal and requests at the July 15, 2013 hearing  
that the district court retain jurisdiction to resolve Clyde Snow’s fee claim accomplished 
the same purpose.  The district court acted within its discretion to allow Clyde Snow to 
participate as a party based on these requests.  
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Furthermore, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision, Clyde Snow could not 
have sought to intervene at an earlier point in time.  Under Utah law, an attorney may not 
move to intervene in an action to enforce a lien before “30 days has expired after a 
demand for payment has been made and not complied with.”  Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-2-7(4)(b).  Under its contingent-fee agreement with Ms. Woodson, Clyde Snow’s 
right to receive payment did not arise until Ms. Woodson settled the underlying case 
through a confidential settlement agreement.  Clyde Snow asked the district court to 
retain jurisdiction to resolve its lien promptly after learning of the settlement and before 
dismissal.  By holding that any attempt by Clyde Snow to intervene on June 28, 2013, 
was untimely, the Court of Appeals effectively eliminated Clyde Snow’s statutory right 
to intervene because the lien right itself did not exist until the case settled, and settlement 
proceeds and fees are typically distributed immediately.  The district court must be given 
discretion to take these circumstances into account, and the Court of Appeals erred by 
substituting its judgment on timeliness for that of the district court.   
Second, the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the district court’s decision that 
any objection based on the requirement to present a formal motion to intervene was 
waived.  Utah law has long recognized that an objection to participation by a non-party 
can be waived.  The record before the district court is clear:  there were no objections by 
Ms. Woodson or the defendants to Clyde Snow’s participation or to the lack of a formal 
motion to intervene, and Boyle’s first objection occurred approximately ten months later, 
after substantial process had occurred.  The Court of Appeals erred by relying on the 
distinguishable circumstances from Ostler v. Buhler, in which the first non-party filings 
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occurred after judgment had been entered rather than upon the record facts on which the 
district court relied.  1999 UT 99, ¶ 9, 989 P.2d 1073. 
B. The Effect of the Interpleading of Funds 
 The Court of Appeals erred by disregarding the effect the deposit of attorney fees 
into court had upon both the district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction to resolve 
competing claims to these funds, and upon Clyde Snow’s status as a party to the equitable 
interpleader proceeding.  As Clyde Snow explained in its briefing to the Court of 
Appeals, the intervention question cannot be divorced from the establishment of the 
interpleader because, once PYG deposited the fees (without objection), it made it 
unnecessary to determine whether the claimants to the fees – Clyde Snow and Boyle – 
should have formally intervened.   Clyde Snow and Boyle submitted to the district court’s 
jurisdiction over the interpleaded fees and received all the process due to parties; each 
filed pleadings setting forth their claims to the fees, engaged in motion practice, and had 
a trial on the merits.   
The Court of Appeals disregarded the substantive effect of the interpleading of the 
funds, choosing instead to render a technical ruling that PYG’s motion and deposit of the 
fees did not create an interpleader because Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires the filing of a pleading.  This ruling is flawed for several reasons.   
 First, Rule 22 does not state that a complaint must be filed to deposit funds into 
the court, particularly where the funds at issue arise from the settlement of the underlying 
case and are deposited in the court that heard the underlying action.  No purpose would 
have been served by requiring PYG to file a complaint or separate action in these 
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circumstances, and the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Rule 22 contradicts both the 
rule’s text and the requirements of “liberal” construction under Rule 1 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Utah R. Civ. P. 1. 
 Second, the Court of Appeals overlooked that Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure authorizes the district court to allow the deposit of money into court upon 
“motion.”  Notably, the district court specifically referenced Rule 67 in granting PYG’s 
Motion to Interplead Funds.  Numerous federal authorities have approved a district 
court’s exercise of its discretion to allow the deposit of attorney fees into court to resolve 
competing claims thereto under very similar circumstances.   
 Third, the Court of Appeals overlooked the effect the deposit of the fees into court 
had upon the district court’s authority to resolve claims to those fees.  It is well 
established that a district court has jurisdiction over funds in its possession.  Once funds 
have been deposited with the court, the court must have authority to determine how to 
distribute those funds.  Moreover, where Ms. Woodson did not assert any claim to the 
fees, and where there was no prejudice to any party (including Boyle) from the deposit, 
any error by the district court in allowing such deposit was harmless, at best.  
C. This Court Has Original Jurisdiction to Issue Writs of Certiorari 
 Even assuming arguendo that Clyde Snow did not obtain party status, this Court 
still has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.  The power to issue a writ of 
certiorari stems from Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.  This Court held in 
Petersen v. Utah Board of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Utah 1995), that the power to 
issue “extraordinary writs” granted by this Constitutional provision includes the power to 
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issue writs of certiorari in favor of parties who have no right to appeal a lower court’s 
decision.   
 Similarly, even if this Court determines that neither Clyde Snow nor Boyle 
obtained party status, it should reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision that declared the 
district court’s decision void after the Court of Appeals determined it did not have 
appellate jurisdiction over Boyle’s appeal.  Under settled Utah law, once an appellate 
court determines it lacks jurisdiction, it has only the power to dismiss the appeal, leaving 
in place the district court order that was appealed.  The Court of Appeals erred by 
declaring the district court’s judgment void after the Court of Appeals determined that it 
lacked appellate jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals’ decision should be reversed and the 
district court’s judgment reinstated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTERVENTION. 
 The first issue on certiorari asks: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that [Clyde 
Snow] did not intervene and that no party to the action waived the 
requirements for formal intervention. 
 
(Order Granting Petition, p. 1.)  The totality of circumstances establishes that the district 
court correctly exercised its discretion to allow Clyde Snow to intervene and participate 
in the underlying action to enforce its attorney’s lien.  The Court of Appeals’ holdings 
that Clyde Snow’s efforts to intervene were untimely and that no party waived the 
requirements for formal intervention are therefore erroneous.   
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A. The Court of Appeals Erred by Ruling that Clyde Snow Failed to 
Timely Seek Leave to Intervene.  
Utah Code Section 38-2-7 creates a lien in favor of an attorney to recover 
“compensation due from a client on any money or property owned by the client that is the 
subject of or connected with work performed for the client[.]”  Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-2-7(2).  An attorney may enforce its lien in the pending legal action in which the 
attorney performed work by “moving to intervene in the pending legal action.”  Id. 
§ 38-2-7(4)(a).  When a contingency fee case is transferred to another firm, the 
originating firm’s right to compensation continues.  Olsen and Brown v. City of 
Englewood, 889 P.2d 673, 675 (Colo. 1995) 
 The Court of Appeals determined the district court erred by retaining jurisdiction 
to resolve Clyde Snow’s claims to recover fees because Clyde Snow’s efforts to intervene 
were untimely.  See Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶¶ 15-16.  This ruling disregards the 
unique nature of the contingency-fee arrangement giving rise to Clyde Snow’s claims and 
the substantial discretion given to the district court to permit intervention.  See State By & 
Through Utah State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 887 (Utah 1996).  
An attorney may not move to intervene in an action or file a separate action to 
enforce a lien “before 30 days has expired after a demand for payment has been made and 
not been complied with.”  Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(4)(b).  This waiting period creates a 
special hurdle for attorneys proceeding under a contingency-fee contract.  Namely, an 
attorney’s right to payment under a contingency-fee contract is not ripe for enforcement 
until the plaintiff secures the right to receive payment from the defendant, either through 
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judgment or settlement.  See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972).  The 
Court of Appeals’ Opinion effectively renders the contingent-fee attorney’s hurdle 
insurmountable. 
 Ms. Woodson and the defendants to the underlying case entered into a confidential 
settlement agreement in or about early June 2013, and sought dismissal of the action in 
mid-June, 2013.  R. 4647-57; 4877-4921.  On June 28, 2013, having just heard of the 
impending settlement (but no other details), Clyde Snow filed its Objection, which 
included a Restated Notice of Attorney’s Lien.  R. 4669-73.  However, because Clyde 
Snow did not know the amount of the settlement or other facts bearing on the right to 
recover fees, such as the amount of time and costs invested by PYG, Clyde Snow could 
not then state the full value of its lien or demand payment from Ms. Woodson and wait 
30 days before seeking to intervene.  
 In holding that any attempt by Clyde Snow to intervene in the underlying case on 
June 28, 2013, would have been untimely, the Court of Appeals created an impossible 
situation for Clyde Snow and all other attorneys proceeding on a contingency-fee 
contract.  Simply stated, if an attempt by an attorney to intervene less than 30 days after a 
plaintiff agrees to a settlement is untimely, as the Court of Appeals held, then an attorney 
with a contingency-fee right can effectively never intervene because the contingent-fee 
attorney (a) has no right to payment until the underlying case is settled; (b) must wait 30 
days after a demand for payment is made to enforce a lien; and (c) must state the amount 
of the lien and verify that he or she has made the 30-day demand for payment within the 
notice of lien.  See Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(6)(b)(2) & (6)(e).   
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Here, although less than 30 days passed from settlement, the Court of Appeals 
held that any intervention effort by Clyde Snow by June 28, 2013, would have been 
untimely.  Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶ 16.  Therefore, the net effect of the Court of 
Appeals’ ruling, contrary to the terms of the attorney-lien statute, is that a contingent-fee 
lawyer can no longer utilize the statutory right to intervene in an underlying case because 
the settlement of the case, the dismissal of the case, and the right to intervene to enforce 
an attorney lien, typically all occur at or near the same time, which is what occurred in 
the Woodson case.   
The ability of a contingent-fee law firm to enforce its lien in the underlying case is 
paramount, and ought to be protected, because it secures the right to recover 
compensation prior to the distribution of settlement proceeds and the payment of fees to 
other lawyers involved in the case.  Moreover, a contingent-fee lawyer’s ability to press 
her or his right to recover fees in the underlying case is worth preserving because the 
court that administers and resolves the underlying case possesses an understanding of the 
legal work that led to the settlement or judgment.         
In contrast to the Court of Appeals, the practical approach adopted by the district 
court to deal with this dilemma was the proper one: it took into account “the totality of 
circumstances” and entered an order well within its discretion.  See Supernova, 2013 UT 
7 at ¶ 15; Sucec, 924 P.2d at 887.  The district court treated Clyde Snow’s Objection and 
oral requests at the July 15, 2013 hearing – both of which occurred prior to entry of final 
judgment – as timely requests for leave to intervene for the purpose of enforcing its 
attorney’s lien.  This Court has recognized that a “motion” and an “objection” can be 
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“interchangeable.”  Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ¶ 138, 130 P.3d 325.  Indeed, it is 
well established that courts look at “the substance, not the labeling[ ] of a motion” to 
determine its character.  Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 388.  
Further, Clyde Snow’s oral requests during the hearing for the court to retain jurisdiction 
to resolve any claims relating to Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien were also in the nature of a 
motion for permissive intervention.  See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) (noting that a “motion made 
during a hearing or trial” need not be in writing).   
After receiving no objection from Ms. Woodson or the defendants to the 
underlying case, the district court (a) dismissed Ms. Woodson and the defendants, (b) 
kept the case open for the limited purpose of resolving Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien, (c) 
granted PYG’s (Ms. Woodson’s counsel) unopposed motion to interplead and deposit the 
fees that were the subject of Clyde Snow’s lien into court, and (d) made the claimants to 
the fees – Clyde Snow and Boyle – “parties” to the proceeding to resolve their claims to 
the funds.  R. 4683-85; 5275-80; 6284-87.  The district court’s July 1, 2014 Order 
denying Boyle’s Motion to Dismiss confirms that this was what it intended to accomplish 
in July of 2013.2    
Furthermore, as the district court ruled, once PYG filed its unopposed motion to 
interplead a portion of the fee recovery into court, and the court accepted the deposit of 
these funds, there was no further need for Clyde Snow to file a formal motion to 
                                                            
2  R. 6285 – stating, “Clyde Snow is a proper interpleader party herein and that any issue 
or other procedural objection associated with the requirement to present a formal motion 
to intervene has been resolved by prior orders of the Court, and establishment of the 
interpleader.” 
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intervene.3  The funds were in the custody of the court, and both Clyde Snow and Boyle 
filed pleadings setting forth their claims to the interpleader res.  R. 5289-5466; 5509-85.  
As set forth in greater detail in Section II below, this was sufficient to confirm the district 
court’s continuing jurisdiction over both the funds and the claimants, as parties.  Down 
Syndrome, 2012 UT 86, ¶ 18  (“[I]t is the service of process, the affirmative act of filing 
suit, or the act of seeking to intervene as a party that subjects one to the jurisdiction of the 
court and puts him on notice that he is subject to ongoing court proceedings.”).4 
The Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge the breadth of the district court’s 
discretion, choosing instead to substitute its own opinion of what the district court should 
have done under the circumstances. This is error.  See Supernova, 2013 UT 7 at ¶ 15; 
Sucec, 924 P.2d at 887. 
The Court of Appeals additionally erred in ruling that Clyde Snow’s intervention 
was untimely because it did not occur until after Ms. Woodson and defendants “had 
settled and resolved their dispute.”  Boyle 2016 UT App 114 at ¶ 16.  “Generally, a 
motion to intervene is timely if it is filed before the ‘final settlement of all issues by all 
parties,’ and before entry of judgment or dismissal.”  Supernova, 2013 UT 7 at ¶ 24 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072, 
                                                            
3  R. 6285 – stating, “Clyde Snow has substantially complied with such obligation by 
filing a pleading that sets forth the grounds and related claims through and by which 
Clyde Snow seeks to recover in relationship to the funds.” 
4  That there was no formal service of process by Clyde Snow or Boyle is immaterial.  
The parties had appeared and submitted to the district court’s jurisdiction, which 
“obviate[ed the] need for service of process.”  Frandsen v. Holladay, 739 P.2d 1111, 
1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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1074 (Utah 1983) (“Generally, the cases hold that intervention is not to be permitted after 
entry of judgment.”) (emphasis added).  The touchstone of untimeliness is not settlement, 
but the entry of judgment. See id.   
It is undisputed that a judgment of dismissal had not been entered by June 28, 
2013.  R. 4679-86.  And because Clyde Snow could not move to intervene until it had 
made its 30-day demand for payment, see Utah Code Ann § 38-2-7(4)(b), which did not 
ripen until settlement, it simply could not have sought to intervene at any earlier point in 
time.  The Court of Appeals therefore erred in relying on the mere fact of a confidential 
settlement between the parties to support its untimeliness conclusion.   
The only authority the Court of Appeals cited to support its untimeliness holding 
was Skypark Airport Ass’n v. Jensen, 2011 UT App 230, 262 P.3d 432.  See Boyle, 2016 
UT App at ¶16.  However, the Court of Appeals ignored that in Skypark, the district court 
exercised its discretion to deny a motion to intervene as untimely after the verdict but 
before judgment was entered.  See Skypark, 2011 UT App 230 at ¶¶ 3-7, n.2.  The present 
case was before the Court of Appeals under a significantly different procedural posture – 
wherein the district court exercised its discretion to allow Clyde Snow to participate as a 
party based on the unique circumstances of this case, without objection by any original 
party, or timely objection by Boyle to either Clyde Snow’s participation or the Court’s 
acceptance of the fee deposit.  R. 6285. This distinction is important due to the substantial 
discretion given to the district court to permit intervention.  Sucec, 924 P.2d at 887.  By 
failing to take into account the district court’s discretion and relying solely upon the 
parties’ settlement, the Court of Appeals erred.    
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B. The Court of Appeals Erred by Ruling No Party Waived Objection to 
Clyde Snow’s Party Participation in the Proceeding. 
The district court’s decision to allow Clyde Snow to participate as a party in the 
underlying action is independently supportable under the doctrine of waiver.  It is well 
established that “parties [can] waive the need for formal intervention.”  See Fisher v. 
Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, ¶ 17, 67 P.3d 1055; accord Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Tax 
Comm’n of State of Utah, 895 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1995) (holding party “waived its 
right to challenge [non-party] UAC’s participation” in the hearing by failing to object to 
that participation, and thus “UAC adequately intervened in the hearing below on a de 
facto basis”); Ostler, 1999 UT 99 at ¶ 7 (parties can waive objection to “informal 
intervention”).5  
The district court relied on these principles as an additional basis for allowing 
Clyde Snow to participate as a party, ruling “any objection based on the requirement to 
present a formal motion to intervene has been waived based on the substantial process 
and other events that have occurred since July of 2013.”  R. 6528.  This ruling has ample 
                                                            
5   Other jurisdictions have adopted similar principles.  See, e.g., Schulz, Davis & Warren 
v. Marinkovich, 661 P.2d 5, 8 (Mont. 1983) (holding a party’s failure to object to 
nonparties’ presence “until the moment of trial amounts to a waiver of any objections to 
his intervention”); Roach v. Churchman, 457 F.2d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1972) (deeming 
the actions of the district court, in affording relief to a nonparty, to be “equivalent to 
authorizing [nonparty] to intervene in the action[,]” and directing the district court, upon 
remand, to “enter an order of intervention nunc pro tunc”); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. 
Blue River Irr. Co., 753 P.2d 737, 740 (Colo. 1988) (viewing a nonparty’s “filing of an 
entry of appearance as analogous to the filing of a defective motion to intervene,” and 
noting that “[w]hen a technically defective motion to intervene is filed, the existing 
parties may waive their right to object to the intervention by failing to make timely 
objections”).  
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record support.   
Counsel for all parties, as well as Boyle, were present at the July 15, 2013 hearing 
when Clyde Snow requested that the Court retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of 
resolving its attorney lien and fee claims.  See R. 6528.  No sustainable or proper 
objection to this request was raised by the attorneys representing, or purporting to 
represent Ms. Woodson at the hearing, including PYG, Boyle or Mr. Atkin.  Id.  In fact, 
Mr. Atkin requested the district court retain jurisdiction to consider a request to nullify 
Clyde Snow’s lien on its merits.6  R. 6528, pp. 5-6.  Indeed, the lack of objection from 
Ms. Woodson to resolving Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien in the existing action is not 
surprising.  Ms. Woodson made no claim to any portion of the funds at issue, which 
represented solely attorney’s fees for work actually performed by lawyers on her case.  
By having the lien resolved in the existing case after she was dismissed, Ms. Woodson 
benefitted by avoiding having to be named as a party defendant in a separate proceeding 
by Clyde Snow to enforce its attorney’s lien.7   
Similarly, defendants’ counsel did nothing more than “voice our concern” about 
the court keeping the case open for the limited purpose of resolving the attorney lien.  R.  
6528, pp. 7-8.  This was not an actual “objection.”  Jensen, 2005 UT 81 at ¶ 138 (“An 
                                                            
6  State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]o properly preserve an 
issue for appeal, a party must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and 
specific.”).      
 
7   Woodson, PYG and Boyle not only had notice of Clyde Snow’s assertion of a lien as 
early as June of 2010, they also recognized Clyde Snow’s right to recover payment 
thereunder as far back as October 2011, by reimbursing Clyde Snow for costs incurred 
from money received from a partial settlement of claims against the State.  R. 6525, pp. 
67-68, 105. 
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objection is defined as a formal statement opposing something that has occurred, or is 
about to occur, in court.”) (citation and quotations omitted).  That defendants’ counsel did 
not object to Clyde Snow’s participation is further buttressed by his subsequent 
statements to the court during the hearing.  For example, when the court asked 
defendants’ counsel whether their concerns would be resolved if the court entered “an 
order dismissing all claims against your client with prejudice . . . and simply leaving open 
the issue of the attorney’s lien,” defendants’ counsel responded: “I think so, Your Honor.  
I just think it would be cleaner the other way.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court gave all parties 
another chance to object at the end of the hearing, after detailing how it intended to rule, 
but before entering its ruling keeping the case open to resolve Clyde Snow’s attorney 
lien.  Id., pp. 16-17.  Despite this additional opportunity, no party objected to the district 
court’s rulings.  Id.  
Thereafter, none of the original parties, nor Boyle, objected to PYG’s deposit of 
the fees into court or to the establishment of the interpleader.  R. 5090-92; 5104-83.  In 
fact, the first and only actual objection to Clyde Snow’s participation came from Boyle 
through his Motion to Dismiss approximately ten months later, after court-ordered 
mediation, discovery and other substantial process had occurred.  R. 5467-74.  However, 
even Boyle agreed when later asked by the district court if he had waived any objection 
to Clyde Snow’s participation.  R. 6524, pp. 9-10.      
The Court of Appeals disregarded this record evidence supporting the district 
court’s waiver ruling.  See Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶¶ 17-22.  In doing so, the Court 
of Appeals failed to give the proper deference to the district court’s fact finding function, 
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which alone undermines the validity of its waiver ruling.  See Mower, 2016 UT App 174 
at ¶ 11.  Rather than afford the district court the necessary deference, the Court of 
Appeals attempted to draw a strained analogy between the circumstances of the present 
case and those in Ostler.  1999 UT 99; see Mower, 2016 UT App 174 at ¶ 11.  However, 
Ostler is plainly distinguishable.   
In Ostler, this Court observed there was no waiver where the attorney at issue, 
Kunkel, made no filing on his own behalf in the case “until after Ostler’s [his former 
client’s] case had been settled and the trial court had dismissed Ostler’s action with 
prejudice.”  Ostler, 1999 UT 99 at ¶ 9.  Here, unlike Ostler, Clyde Snow’s June 28, 2013 
Objection and its request at the July 2013 hearing that the district court retain jurisdiction 
to resolve its attorney’s lien were made before dismissal of the underlying action, taking 
this case outside of Ostler.  R. 4669-73.  In addition, here, no party lodged an objection to 
the district court’s indication that it intended to dismiss the defendants, but hold the 
matter open for resolution of Clyde Snow’s attorney lien.  R. 4683-86; 6528, pp. 8, 
16-17.  Moreover, to further distinguish Ostler, none of the settling parties contested 
Clyde Snow’s claim to recover attorney fees.  R. 6528.  Ostler is thus procedurally and 
factually distinct from the present case, and the Court of Appeals erred by substituting its 
judgment on waiver and intervention for the district court’s.  See Sucec, 924 P.2d at 887; 
Mower, 2016 UT App 174, at ¶ 11.8  
                                                            
8  Arguably, even if an error were assumed, the doctrine of invited error appears 
applicable, given Boyle’s participation, representations, and filings before the district 
court.  See Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶ 12, 163 P.3d 615 (“The 
invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking advantage of an error committed at 
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeals’ rationale that Ms. Woodson and the 
defendants were somehow excused from their obligations to object because it would have 
been “futile,” or put them at risk of having Clyde Snow treated as a party or “having the 
court rule in a manner contrary to their interests,” Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶ 22, also 
departs from established Utah law.  The very purpose of requiring a party to object to a 
ruling he or she believes is erroneous is to preserve the objection for review.  See, e.g., 
Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App 355, ¶ 11, 993 P.2d 222.  Unlike in 
Ostler, counsel for Ms. Woodson and the defendants were present at the hearing on Clyde 
Snow’s Objection and had an opportunity to object if they so desired.  They did not 
object because there was no reason to object.  They were not prejudiced and have not 
claimed to be prejudiced by the district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction to resolve 
Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien.  And, under Utah law, by not objecting to Clyde Snow’s 
participation, they waived the right to object.  Dejavue, 1999 UT App 355 at ¶ 11.  
Notably, neither Ms. Woodson nor any defendant has objected to this day, and, as 
indicated, Boyle repeatedly conceded by both words and conduct that he waived any 
objection. R. 5104-83; 6524, pp. 9-10; 6528, pp. 5-6.   
Finally, it bears emphasis that the only parties interested in the funds at issue – 
Clyde Snow and Boyle – have already had their claims adjudicated, following a full trial 
on the merits.  The Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate the district court’s judgment 
serves little purpose other than to require a do-over.  Such a result, particularly under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  
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circumstances of this case, is wasteful, unwarranted, and should be avoided.  See 
Martindell v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding, in further 
support of its ruling that any need for formal intervention was waived, that “since the 
district court has already adjudicated the issues raised by the Government we are not 
disposed to remand the case to the district court for the rather wasteful procedure of 
requiring the Government formally to seek post hoc intervention that would undoubtedly 
be granted, with the result that the case would then be returned to us for review”).  After 
all, “[i]t is the purpose of the law, and of the court in administering it, to do justice and to 
look through form to substance when necessary to accomplish that objective.”  Hart 
Bros. Music Co. v. Wood, 384 P.2d 591, 593-94 (Utah 1963); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 1.   
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Clyde Snow failed to timely 
intervene and that no party waived the requirements for formal intervention.  The Court 
of Appeals’ decision should be reversed and the district court’s judgment reinstated.  
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY RULING THE DISTRICT 
COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO 
RESOLVE CLAIMS TO MONEY DEPOSITED IN COURT. 
The second issue upon which this Court granted the Petition is: 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding [Clyde Snow’s] 
arguments regarding its status as an interpleader party were 
inadequately briefed and did not demonstrate such a status. 
 
(Order Granting Petition, p. 1.)  For the reasons stated below, Clyde Snow sufficiently 
briefed to the Court of Appeals how the establishment of the interpleader affected its 
status as a party and how the Court of Appeals’ treatment of this issue was both 
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incomplete and erroneous.  Clyde Snow will address substantively the effect of the 
interpleader before addressing the sufficiency of the briefing.    
A. The Court Of Appeals Erred by Ruling the District Court Lacked 
Jurisdiction Over the Claims of Boyle and Clyde Snow, Asserted 
Through Pleadings, to Fees Deposited With the Court. 
Clyde Snow’s status as a party, and the district court’s authority to enter orders 
affecting its interests, is further supported by the establishment of the equitable 
interpleader proceeding.  “An action in interpleader is a proceeding in equity in which a 
person who has possession of money or property which may be owned or claimed by 
others seeks to rid himself of risk of liability, or possible multiple liability, by disclaiming 
his interest and submitting the matter of ownership for adjudication by the court.”  
Terry's Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur, 618 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah 1980).    
  1. The establishment of the interpleader.  
On January 30, 2014, shortly after mediation failed, PYG filed a motion to 
interplead the attorneys’ fees over which Clyde Snow claimed a lien.  R. 5073-86.  PYG 
represented it had no interest in the disputed fees, and that the only parties with claims to 
the fees were “Mr. Boyle and Mr. Wiese, and Clyde Snow.”  Id.  PYG argued it should 
be allowed to interplead and deposit the funds into court to “avoid any risk of liability, 
including multiple liability” to the claimants, and be released from further liability.  Id. 
None of the claimants opposed PYG’s motion, and in March 2014, the district 
court exercised its authority to enter an order granting PYG’s motion and established the 
interpleader by directing PYG to deposit the funds into court pursuant to “Rule 67 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.”  R. at 5275-80.  Thereafter, PYG deposited the funds 
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into the court, vesting the district court with jurisdiction over the funds, and Clyde Snow 
and Boyle then filed pleadings, as parties, asserting their claims to the interpleaded res, 
which they willingly and actively litigated.  R. 5289-5466; 5104-83; 6525; 6322-33.  As 
the district court ruled, the deposit of this money into court, and the interpleader 
proceedings that followed, eliminated any further need for Clyde Snow to file a formal 
motion to intervene.  R. 6285. 
2. The Court Appeals’ rulings regarding the establishment and effect 
of the interpleader were erroneous.  
The Court of Appeals relegated the entirety of its discussion of interpleader to a 
footnote.  Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶ 23 n.4.  Even where discussed, the Court of 
Appeals gave the argument short shrift, opining that PYG’s motion did not create an 
interpleader action to the funds because “[p]roper interpleader actions” under Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 22 “are asserted in a complaint or by way of cross-claim or 
counterclaim.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The Court of Appeals’ treatment of this issue is 
erroneous in several respects.   
First, the Court of Appeals’ analysis ignores the reality of the situation and “exalts 
form over substance.”  See generally Youngblood v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 
¶ 22, 158 P.3d 1088 (observing that “[o]ur rules of pleading require that a cause be made 
out, but not necessarily that it always be correctly labeled,” for “[s]uch an exalting of 
form over substance ... is to be avoided when possible”).  It is similarly well established 
that “[a] court of equity looks through form to substance.”  Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 
782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quotations and citation omitted) (alteration in original).  
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The Court of Appeals disregarded these concepts in holding that PYG’s motion to 
interplead the funds did not “establish an interpleader action” because Rule 22 “requires 
filing a pleading.”  Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶23 n.4.  Notably, the text of Rule 22 
does not state that a complaint or other pleading must be filed to interplead or deposit 
funds into court or to litigate claims to such funds and the Court of Appeals cited no 
authority supporting such an interpretation.  See id.  Reading such a requirement into 
Rule 22 is not only inconsistent with the plain language of Rule 22, it contradicts the 
spirit of “liberal” construction required by Rule 1.  See Utah R. Civ. P. 1; 22.   
The message from the Court of Appeals instead is that if PYG had filed a so-called 
complaint-in-intervention seeking leave to interplead the funds, rather than seeking the 
same relief by motion, then any procedural concerns would have evaporated, 
notwithstanding that no party objected to the procedure chosen by Ms. Woodson’s 
counsel.  But, the funds would have been deposited with the court either way, with the 
exact same parties making the exact same claims to the exact same funds.  By reading 
Rule 22 to require a pleading instead of a motion that accomplishes the same result, the 
Court of Appeals has grafted an inefficient and unwelcome new requirement onto the 
rule, which should be avoided,9 particularly in an equitable interpleader action.  See 
Hudson Sav. Bank v. Austin, 479 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 2007) (“At bottom, interpleader 
is an equitable mechanism, and courts should not hesitate to ‘eliminat[e] those technical 
                                                            
9 See Utah R. Civ. P. 1, 22; Aequitas Enterprises, LLC v. Interstate Inv. Group, LLC, 
2011 UT 82, ¶ 17, 267 P.3d 923 (procedural rules are interpreted according to plain 
language, in harmony with other rules); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n of Utah, 300 P.2d 600, 602 (Utah 1956) (observing “the law is more concerned 
with substance than with labels or titles”).  
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restraints on the device that are not founded on adequate policy considerations.’”) 
(quoting 7 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1704, at 541 (3d ed.2001)). 
Second, the Court of Appeals also overlooked that Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure authorizes the district court to order the deposit money into court upon 
the filing of a “motion” indicating that the money “belongs or is due to another party.”  
Utah R. Civ. P. 67.  This is what the district court accomplished, as shown by its 
reference to Rule 67 in its Order granting the Motion to Interplead Funds.  R. 5276.  This 
is a proper use of a trial court’s authority under Rule 67.  As the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals observed under circumstances similar to the present case: 
Rule 67 leaves to the discretion of the district court the decision as to 
whether to permit the deposit of funds in court.  We will not 
overturn the magistrate’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. . . 
The [lower court] magistrate acted well within his discretionary 
authority in allowing the funds to be paid into court and excusing the 
defendants. His decision both ensured that the settlement fund would 
be available for disbursement and facilitated judicial economy by 
permitting the defendants, who no longer had an interest in the funds 
or in these proceedings, to withdraw. 
 
Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1989).10   
It is not material that the funds, as fees collected by PYG, were deposited by PYG 
rather than Ms. Woodson or the defendants.  The deposited funds came from the 
                                                            
10   See also Alstom Caribe, Inc. v. George P. Reintjes Co., Inc., 484 F.3d 106, 114 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (“As a general proposition, it is within a district court's sound discretion to 
accept a deposit of settlement funds in order to allow a settling defendant to withdraw 
from litigation while competing claimants continue to squabble over their entitlement to 
the settlement proceeds. As a corollary of this proposition, a defendant may be allowed to 
tender a Rule 67 deposit even if one or more of the competing claimants is not a party to 
the action.”) (citations omitted).  
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settlement of the claims in the underlying case, and were deposited by Ms. Woodson’s 
counsel in the underlying case (PYG).  R. 5284-88.  Upon the district court’s order, and 
the deposit of the funds into court, Clyde Snow and Boyle each filed pleadings asserting 
their claims to the funds, and thereby became the “parties” to the contested interpleaded 
res.  R. 5289-5466; 5104-83. See Utah R. Civ. P. 21 (“Parties may be dropped or added 
by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the 
action and on such terms as are just.”) (emphasis added); see also Down Syndrome, 2012 
UT 86 at ¶ 18 (noting “the affirmative act of filing suit . . . subjects one to the jurisdiction 
of the court”).  
The district court’s actions caused no prejudice and were consistent with the 
assertion of equitable authority and with the “speedy” and “just” administrative of justice.  
Utah R. Civ. P. 1.  As the United States Supreme Court has observed regarding the 
“comprehensiveness of equitable jurisdiction”:   
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable 
powers of the District Court are available for the proper and 
complete exercise of that jurisdiction . . . It may act so as to adjust 
and reconcile competing claims and so as to accord full justice to all 
the real parties in interest; if necessary, persons not originally 
connected with the litigation may be brought before the court so that 
their rights in the subject matter may be determined and enforced. In 
addition, the court may go beyond the matters immediately 
underlying its equitable jurisdiction and decide whatever other issues 
and give whatever other relief may be necessary under the 
circumstances. Only in that way can equity do complete rather than 
truncated justice. 
 
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not 
to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative      
command. . . 
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Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).  The Court of Appeals departed from these fundamental principles. 
Third, the Court of Appeals disregarded the effect the deposit of the funds into the 
court had upon the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to resolve claims to those funds.  
“Subject matter jurisdiction ... is the authority of the court to decide the case.”  Johnson v. 
Johnson, 2010 UT 28 at ¶ 8 (ellipses in original) (citation and quotations omitted). “[T]he 
concept of subject matter jurisdiction relates to ‘the relationship between the claim and 
the forum that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction.’”  Id. at ¶ 9 (citation omitted).  
Although Clyde Snow is unable to locate any Utah authority addressing this exact 
issue, it is well-accepted that a court has subject matter jurisdiction over money or 
property in its possession.  See, e.g., Adams v. Allied Chem. Corp., 503 F. Supp. 253, 255 
(E.D. Va. 1980) (“Jurisdiction over a fee claim may also be found where the claim relates 
to assets in the actual or constructive possession of the court.”).11  The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York’s holding is instructive:  
In any event, belated categorization of the procedural steps under 
Rule 67 or any other rubric is not essential to the ultimate denial of 
claimant's motion [for disbursement of funds back to the depositing 
party, who had disclaimed any interest]. For however the procedural 
                                                            
11   See also, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Kelly, 106 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1939) 
(observing, the attachment of the funds “brought those funds within control of the Court” 
and “the court having possession of the res or its equivalent ought to be clothed with 
jurisdiction upon proper application to establish the lien and disburse the fund”); United 
States v. Rubenstein, 971 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Funds deposited in the registry 
of a federal district court are in custodia legis. As such, the district court's control over 
the funds is virtually supreme.”); Grimes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 841, 844 
(2d Cir.1977) (court had ancillary jurisdiction to decide a fee dispute between trial 
counsel and attorney of record after the court approved the settlement because the 
settlement funds were in the court's registry and therefore within its control). 
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moves may be rationalized, there is a primitive and fundamental 
principle of jurisdiction that is overlooked by the claimant. This is, 
of course, the hard and decisive fact of possession by the court— a 
most elementary basis upon which the court is empowered, and 
required, to exercise the “right to say” (jurisdiction) where the res 
belongs. That basic obligation, inherent in the court's very 
functioning as a court, is inconsistent with the claimant's notion that 
the court should simply cast the money away without deciding who 
has a right to take it. “A court, which has custody of the res, must at 
some time surrender it, and it can know to whom it should deliver 
only in case it either decides the right to possession itself, or awaits 
the action of such other competent tribunal as the claimant may 
choose.” There is no suggestion of any other competent or available 
tribunal. The money and the controversy attending it are both 
inescapably here. The duty of decision is likewise in this court. 
 
Reliable Marine Boiler Repair Inc. v. Sum of $35,000.00, 270 F.Supp. 1017, 1020-21 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Once PYG deposited the interpleaded res, the district court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction over the res and any claims thereto was perfected and continued until the res 
was disbursed.12  This is particularly true where the funds were deposited based on Clyde 
Snow’s assertion of its attorney’s lien to a portion of the settlement proceeds arising out 
of the underlying case.  Once the funds were deposited, the district court had to decide to 
whom to disburse them, especially where neither PYG nor Ms. Woodson wanted them 
back.  See Reliable Marine, 270 F.Supp. at 1020-21; see also Garrett, 201 F.2d at 253.  
Thus, the failure, if any, by Clyde Snow to file a document entitled “motion to intervene” 
                                                            
12   Garrett v. McRee, 201 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1953) (stating, “the jurisdiction of the 
court is not exhausted so long as the funds are in the registry of the court and adverse 
claims are asserted thereto; and where an attorney recovers a fund in a suit under a 
contract with a client providing that he shall be compensated only out of the fund he 
creates, the court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit has power to fix the 
attorney's compensation and direct its payment out of the fund”).  
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was resolved when the district court’s accepted the deposit of the interpleaded res of 
funds and acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the res.   
Fourth, even assuming arguendo error could be found in any of the district court’s 
actions, the complete lack of prejudice renders any error harmless.  See, e.g., Hall v. 
NACM Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, ¶ 21, 988 P.2d 942 (“We do not reverse the trial 
court for committing harmless error.”).  Both Boyle and Clyde Snow received the full 
process of law, including a trial on the merits of their claims to the interpleaded funds.13   
B. Clyde Snow Adequately Raised This Issue to the Court of Appeals. 
 In the Order granting the Petition, this Court questioned whether the Court of 
Appeals may have declined to consider the effect of interpleader on the basis that it was 
inadequately briefed.14  (Order Granting Petition, p. 1).  Although the Court of Appeals 
discussed this issue only in a footnote, Clyde Snow addressed the effect of the 
interpleader upon its party status at length in both its Brief of Appellee and Supplemental 
Brief of Appellee, including to argue that “any requirement to intervene was waived, or 
                                                            
13  Cf. In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103, 109 (Utah 1927) (holding the district court 
had personal and subject matter jurisdiction although the parties were incorrectly 
designated because the court looks to “substance and not to mere form,” and “the powers 
exercised by the court in the cause, the procedure adopted, and all of the rights and 
remedies accorded the parties, were the same as, and no less or different than, had the 
parties been designated the treasurer as plaintiff and the heirs as defendants in the 
cause”).  
14   The Court of Appeals did not state it was declining to consider Clyde Snow’s 
argument regarding the effect of the interpleader because it was inadequately briefed.  
See Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶ 23 n.4.  To the extent the Court of Appeals did rely on 
such an unexpressed basis, this itself is error.  See Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, ¶ 8, 984 
P.2d 987 (holding the Court of Appeals’ opinion was “inadequate” where it did not 
identify “the basis for refusing to treat an issue,” or designate “which issues lacked merit” 
or “were not supported by proper legal argument”).  
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rendered moot by the establishment of an interpleader.”  (Brief of Appellee, p. 22; see 
also id. pp. 1-2, 12-16, 22-26; Supplemental Brief of Appellee, 3-7 (arguing specifically 
that the establishment of the interpleader within the action distinguished this case from 
Down Syndrome by making both Clyde Snow and Boyle parties)). This was adequate.  
See Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, ¶ 8, 995 P.2d 14 (“An issue is inadequately 
briefed when ‘the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 
research and argument to the reviewing court.’”).  
 Moreover, although Clyde Snow may not have framed its arguments in exactly the 
same manner, or emphasized all of the same authorities in its briefing before the Court of 
Appeals, this is explained by the posture of the appeal.  Clyde Snow was the appellee, 
responding to issues framed by Boyle.  While Boyle claimed Clyde Snow did not 
properly intervene, he did not claim that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to establish the interpleader itself or that the district court failed to follow 
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in doing so.  (See Brief of Appellant, pp. 
17-24.)  Additionally, despite ordering Supplemental Briefing, the Court of Appeals did 
not give any indication that it was looking into the district court’s jurisdiction, or 
questioning the establishment of the interpleader.  Rather, the Court of Appeals asked for 
further discussion only on whether “the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over this 
appeal,” if “Appellant  [Boyle] was not a party to the underlying action.” (Order, Add. F 
hereto) (emphasis added).   Had the Court of Appeals indicated it was looking into the 
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, Clyde Snow could have provided additional 
discussion of the authorities cited herein.  In these circumstances, to the extent the Court 
40 
 
of Appeals based its decision regarding interpleader upon the inadequate briefing 
doctrine, it erred.   
III. THIS COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO CORRECT THE COURT OF APPEALS’ ERRONEOUS 
RULING DECLARING THE DISTRICT COURT’S JUDGMENT VOID.  
The third issue upon which this Court granted the Petition is: 
If [Clyde Snow] did not acquire party status, whether this Court can 
acquire jurisdiction via a petition for a writ of certiorari to reverse or 
vacate a Court of Appeals[’] decision that purported to declare a 
district court[’]s judgment void notwithstanding its concession of a 
lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
(Order Granting Petition, p. 1).  So framed, the Court need not reach this issue if it agrees 
with Clyde Snow’s position on either of the first two issues for which the Petition was 
granted.15  In the event this Court does reach this issue, Clyde Snow responds in two 
parts.  First, this Court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari even if Clyde 
Snow did not obtain party status.  Second, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the 
district court’s judgment void after it determined it did not have appellate jurisdiction.   
A. The Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction to Issue a Writ of 
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 
This Court has held that “persons or entities that are not parties to a proceeding are 
not entitled to an appeal as of right.”  Down Syndrome, 2012 UT 86 at ¶ 9 (citing 
                                                            
15   Given the manner in which the Court framed this issue, Clyde Snow believes it is 
applicable only if the Court determines Clyde Snow did not become a party through 
intervention, waiver, or the establishment of the interpleader proceeding.  This Court 
must have jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the district court erred 
in allowing Clyde Snow to participate as a party, as this is the very decision that called 
into question Clyde Snow’s status as a party.  See Nichols, 2016 UT 19 at ¶ 13 (Supreme 
Court reviews decision on Court of Appeals on writ of certiorari, not the district court).  
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Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, ¶ 46, 110 P.3d 678, and 
State v. Sun Sur. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, ¶ 9, 99 P.3d 818).  Instead, “an extraordinary writ 
is the vehicle pursuant to which [nonparties can] properly . . . challenge [] [a court] 
order.”  Down Syndrome, 2012 UT 86 at ¶ 9 (alterations in original) (quotations and 
citations omitted).  
However, Down Syndrome and the authorities cited therein considered only the 
question of appellate jurisdiction in a direct appeal by a non-party.  See Down Syndrome, 
2012 UT 86 at ¶¶ 13, 23 (“It is because we lack appellate jurisdiction, and thus the power 
to hear this particular appeal, that we must dismiss Mr. Gilbert’s case.”) (emphasis in 
original); accord Tremco, 2005 UT 19 at ¶¶46-47 (overruled on other grounds); Sun Sur. 
Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74 at ¶ 9.  These authorities did not consider the scope of this Court’s 
original jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, which is broad 
enough to confer power on this Court to reverse an erroneous decision of the Court of 
Appeals, even if Clyde Snow did not acquire formal party status.   
The power to issue a writ of certiorari stems from the Utah Constitution.  Article 
VIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has “original 
jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs.”  Utah Const. art. VIII § 3.  “The constitution 
does not define the term ‘extraordinary writs,’ but the meaning of the term can be 
ascertained in large measure from the history of Article VIII.”  Petersen v. Utah Bd. of 
Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Utah 1995).  
“The term ‘extraordinary writs’ first appeared in the Utah Constitution in the 1984 
rewriting of Article VIII.”  Id.  However,  
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[a]s initially adopted in 1896, Article VIII, section 4 of the 
constitution referred to specific writs:  “The Supreme Court shall 
have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, 
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus.  In other cases, the 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, and power to 
issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that jurisdiction.”  
 
Id. (quoting Utah Const. art. VIII, sec. 4 (1896)).  “The term ‘extraordinary writs’ that 
appears in the 1984 rewrite of Article VIII, section 3 was intended to include the specific 
writs mentioned in the original version of Article VIII, including ‘all writs necessary and 
proper for the exercise’ of the Supreme Court's appellate function,” and “the prerogative 
writ[] of . . . certiorari.”   Id. (emphasis added).  Relying on this construction, the 
Petersen Court held that it had original jurisdiction to address the issues raised in the 
petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, even though petitioner “had no right to 
appeal” from the lower court’s decision and was “not properly before this Court on 
appeal.”  Id. 
 This Court’s discussion of the writ of certiorari in Boggess v. Morris is also 
instructive.  635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).  The Court stated that the constitutional language 
that “empowers this Court to issue the writ of certiorari . . . refers to the writ defined by 
the common law . . . .”  Id. at 42.  “The scope of review by the common-law writ of 
certiorari was very broad, encompassing not just questions of jurisdiction but also a 
review of the evidence and the regularity of the proceedings . . . .”  Id. (citations omitted).  
“Common-law certiorari is a discretionary writ” that “is available in aid of an appellate 
court’s supervision of the actions of inferior courts, especially in implementing the 
process of appellate review.”  Id.; accord Higgins v. Burton, 232 P. 917 (Utah 1924) 
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(granting writ of certiorari at the request of the district attorney to review a lower court’s 
order that was not subject to appellate review by any other means). 
 Pursuant to these authorities, this Court has original jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
certiorari to review and, if necessary, to reverse or vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision, 
even in circumstances in which no direct right to appeal exists, such as in the case of an 
aggrieved nonparty.16   That this Court has the power to issue a writ of certiorari, even if   
sought by a nonparty, is further buttressed by this Court’s statement in Down Syndrome 
that “a nonparty who seeks relief from a lower court’s order that purports to affect the 
nonparty’s interests must proceed by way of extraordinary writ.”  Down Syndrome, 2012 
UT 86 at ¶ 10.  As indicated, the term “extraordinary writ” specifically incorporates the 
“writ of certiorari.”  Petersen, 907 P.2d at 1152.  Where an extraordinary writ is available 
to a nonparty, then a fortiori the writ of certiorari is as well.  See id.  Accordingly, this 
Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to reverse or vacate the Court of 
Appeals’ decision.17   
B. The Court of Appeals Erred by Declaring the District Court’s 
Judgment Void After Determining Boyle Had No Right of Direct 
Appeal.  
Even assuming arguendo this Court determines that neither Clyde Snow nor Boyle 
                                                            
16 See Petersen, 907 P.2d at 1152; see also Boggess, 635 P.2d at 43 (holding, “we 
exercise our discretion to issue the common-law writ of certiorari to bring up the record 
and allow defendant a direct review in this Court of the alleged errors in his trial for 
manslaughter, on the merits, just as if he had taken an appeal within the statutory 
period”). 
17  Boyle cannot take advantage of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
certiorari because he did not file the requisite petition to invoke this jurisdiction.  See 
Utah R. App. P. 45. 
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obtained party status, it should reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision because it 
misinterpreted this Court’s opinion in Down Syndrome.  See 2012 UT 86. 
The Court of Appeals made two primary rulings.  First, it ruled the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to enter orders with respect to the attorney fees at issue, and declared 
the district court’s rulings and judgment with respect to Clyde Snow’s attorney’s lien 
void.  Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶¶ 1, 12, 23, 25.  Second, the Court of Appeals ruled 
that because Clyde Snow and Boyle were not formally parties, it lacked appellate 
jurisdiction “to review Boyle’s and Clyde Snow’s arguments regarding the merits of the 
district court’s determinations,” citing Down Syndrome.  Id. at ¶ 24.   
The Court of Appeals misconstrued Down Syndrome.  Under Down Syndrome, the 
Court of Appeals’ second ruling that it lacked appellate jurisdiction precluded it from 
reaching its first ruling that the district court lacked jurisdiction.18   
In Down Syndrome, the district court entered a “Disgorgement Order” against 
Donald Gilbert to disgorge funds improperly paid to Mr. Gilbert.  See Down Syndrome, 
2012 UT 86 at ¶¶ 2-5.  Unlike here, Mr. Gilbert was admittedly never a party to the suit.  
Id. at ¶ 5.  Two years after the Disgorgement Order was entered, Mr. Gilbert filed a 
motion to vacate it on the basis that it “was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because 
he was never named a party or personally served with motions or the order.”  Id. at ¶ 6.  
The district court denied Gilbert’s motion on the merits and Gilbert appealed.  Id. 
This Court “dismiss[ed] Mr. Gilbert’s direct appeal for lack of appellate 
                                                            
18   For the reasons stated, the Court of Appeals’ appellate jurisdiction to consider Boyle’s 
direct appeal is distinct from this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari 
to review the Court of Appeals’ Opinion.   
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jurisdiction because, as a nonparty, Mr. Gilbert was not entitled to an appeal as of right.”  
Id. at ¶ 8.  As a “nonparty,” Mr. Gilbert was required to “proceed by way of an 
extraordinary writ.”  Id. at ¶ 10.  Notably, in dismissing Mr. Gilbert’s appeal, this Court 
left in place the district court’s Disgorgement Order – a coercive injunctive order against 
Mr. Gilbert – notwithstanding its determination that Mr. Gilbert was a not a party to the 
underlying suit and Mr. Gilbert’s argument that the district court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over him.  See id. at ¶¶ 11, 32.  This Court did not reach the question of 
whether the district court had jurisdiction over Mr. Gilbert to issue the Disgorgement 
Order because “‘[w]hen [an appellate] court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal, it retains 
only the authority to dismiss the appeal.’”  Id. at ¶ 7.   
To the extent Boyle was never made a “party,” the same result was required here. 
Under Down Syndrome, the Court of Appeals was left with a single option upon 
determining that Boyle was not a party:  to dismiss his appeal of the district court’s 
rulings.  See id.  Indeed, the circumstances here are even more compelling because Boyle 
never claimed the district court lacked jurisdiction.  He, in fact, claimed the opposite. 
(Boyle’s Supp. Brief to Court of Appeals, pp. 5-6).  
The Court of Appeals disregarded the strictures imposed by Down Syndrome by 
evaluating the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Boyle and Clyde Snow after 
the Court of Appeals concluded they were not parties to the proceedings below, and 
holding the district court’s judgment was void.  Boyle, 2016 UT App 114 at ¶¶ 1, 12, 23, 
25.  Such a ruling granted Boyle the relief he sought on appeal: reversal of the district 
court’s decision.  This is plainly erroneous under Down Syndrome.  This Court should 
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therefore reverse and vacate the Court of Appeals’ Opinion on this alternative basis.19    
CONCLUSION 
 For each and all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue the writ of 
certiorari to the Court of Appeals, and reverse or vacate the Court of Appeals’ Opinion.  
 
DATED this  23rd day of November 2016. 
 
       NELSON CHRISTENSEN  
       HOLLINGWORTH & WILLIAMS 
 
        /s/ Jeffery S. Williams   
Jeffery S. Williams 
Attorney for Clyde Snow & Sessions, 
P.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19   Clyde Snow is aware of Gilbert v. Third District Court Judges, 2016 UT 31, issued 
July 20, 2016, which continues Mr. Gilbert’s saga from Down Syndrome.  The Gilbert 
decision does not impact Clyde Snow’s analysis of Down Syndrome.  Clyde Snow further 
notes that, in denying Mr. Gilbert’s petition for extraordinary relief, this Court left in 
place the orders entered against Mr. Gilbert by the trial court, without considering Mr. 
Gilbert’s claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him as a nonparty.  Gilbert, 
2016 UT 31 at ¶¶ 20-21. 
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